Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers: Implications for New Zealand by Julie Tam & Heather Kirkham
Acknowledgements: 
An earlier draft of this paper was prepared by Julie Tam in 2000, and has been updated by Heather Kirkham. 
Thanks to John Janssen and Bob Buckle for their comments and useful insights, and to Paul Rodway and 
Katy Henderson for their work on the tax elasticities.  Any remaining errors or omissions are the 
responsibility of the authors.   
 
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the New Zealand Treasury 




Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers: 
Implications for New Zealand 
 
 
Julie Tam* and Heather Kirkham** 
 
* Department of Economics 
Stanford University 
579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305-6072, USA 
Email: JulieTam@stanford.edu 
 
** The Treasury 
PO Box 3724 







Automatic fiscal stabilisers, or the cyclical components of the budget balance, are larger in 
New Zealand than in the average OECD country, reflecting both higher sensitivity to the 
economic cycle, and a more volatile cycle.  Fiscal vigilance is especially important in New 
Zealand.  Large projected operating surpluses could easily disappear if lower economic 
outcomes are mistakenly assumed to be cyclical.  But, automatic stabilisers are difficult to 
use in a policy framework as empirical estimates of the cyclical budget balance vary 
significantly.  While the estimated trend in automatic stabilisers is broadly similar, the level 
varies significantly, such that at any point in time a ‘structural surplus’ may be dependant 
on the estimation method. 
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1.    INTRODUCTION 
The operation of fiscal policy has changed considerably during the past 50 years. 
Concerns about using discretionary fiscal policy have resulted in greater emphasis on the 
role of automatic fiscal stabilisers to smooth the economic cycle. Discretionary changes in 
fiscal policy have been increasingly assigned to medium to long-term objectives (see for 
example Taylor, 2000).  
 
This paper investigates the relative size of automatic stabilisers in New Zealand, and 
draws policy implications. The difficulty of using automatic stabilisers for  fiscal 
management, given their variability under different estimation techniques, is discussed.  
 
Section 2 of this paper provides an overview of the literature and evidence around the 
effectiveness of automatic stabilisers. Section 3 compares the size of automatic stabilisers 
in New Zealand with other OECD countries. The policy implications for New Zealand are 
discussed in light of the Fiscal Responsibility Act (1994) and its prudence requirements in 
section 4. Alternative estimation techniques are compared and the results are found to be 
highly sensitive to output gap estimates in sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes while the 
Appendix provides further technical detail.  
 
2.    AUTOMATIC FISCAL STABILISERS – A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
The actual government budget balance includes structural (invariant to the cycle) and 
cyclical components, and can be represented as: 
 
Actual budget balance = structural + cyclical 
1 
 
The operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers assumes that the government holds tax and 
benefit payment rates constant over the economic cycle. The alternative is to change tax 
and benefit rates each year sufficient to maintain constant dollar  values of tax and 
spending to ensure that the government accounts balance each year across the economic 
cycle.  
 
Effects on the economy 
Automatic fiscal stabilisers are the variation in the budget balance as a result of an 
exogenous aggregate demand or real GDP shock (represented by  cyclical above). For 
example, an exogenous cyclical shock such as a contraction in aggregate private sector 
demand, will tend to reduce tax revenue while increasing unemployment benefit spending, 
thereby reducing the government’s budget balance. The consequential automatic increase 
in government spending is likely to help mitigate the effect of the initial adverse shock on 
aggregate demand. 
 
The stronger this automatic stabiliser effect is, the less need there is for 
discretionary fiscal policy action as a result of the cycle.  This is important if discretionary 
policies are subject to irreversibility problems (Goff, 1998) and if they adversely affect the 
credibility of fiscal policy.  
 
There is also a widely held view that automatic fiscal stabilisers act more rapidly than other 
stabilisation tools.  Automatic fiscal stabilisers do not involve the “inside lag” that typically 
                                                 
1 A more detailed description of the calculation can be found in Section 5 and the Appendix.   4
accompanies a discretionary change in fiscal policy. It is also argued that they involve a 
shorter “outside lag” that typically characterises monetary policy.
2   
 
Furthermore, automatic stabilisers “insure” individuals against the impact of potential job 
loss.  Cohen and Follette (1999) argue that the government is better placed to provide this 
insurance to individual taxpayers as it can diversify across all taxpayers.  
 
Automatic stabilisers also help liquidity-constrained households smooth consumption, 
which they are not able to do themselves as they are unable to borrow against future 
labour income. Temporary tax rate changes, which would be required if automatic 
stabilisers were prevented from working, would directly impact on the consumption of 
liquidity constrained households, even though households know the tax rate change is 
likely to be reversed.
3  
 
Limits on use 
Correctly identifying the type of shock as either permanent or temporary is important to 
ensure the government reacts appropriately.  If a shock is permanent, but treated as 
temporary then the fiscal stance would be inappropriate – either too tight or too loose. 
Determining the nature of the shock can be difficult, suggesting that budget prudence is 
advisable. The experience of the UK provides an example. In 1993/94 the actual level of 
output was over 9 per cent lower than the illustrative projections for that year in the 1990 
Financial Statement and Budget Report  (FSBR), leading to a sharp deterioration in public 
finances (HM Treasury 1997). 
 
Additionally, automatic stabilisers need to be allowed to run on both the up and down sides 
of the cycle (Fowlie, 1999).  There is a temptation for governments to spend the upside 
gain of economic cycles and then have to finance the fiscal cost of a downturn through 
borrowing. This can lead to ratcheting debt levels over time (Skilling, 2001).   
 
As automatic stabilisers may impact on domestic interest rates, Pesaran and Robinson 
(1997) argue that cyclical government borrowing is undesirable if a government has to 
make significant demands on the domestic capital market.   
 
Discussion on effectiveness 
Macro-econometric models have been used to estimate the effect automatic stabilisers 
have on the real economy.   OECD simulations (1999a) using the INTERLINK model 
estimate that automatic stabilisers reduced output volatility in the 1990s by between 25-33 
per cent in the US and France, 50 per cent in the Netherlands, and 33 per cent for New 
Zealand.  
 
A number of studies have examined the effect of automatic fiscal stabilisers on the US 
economy.  Cohen and Follette (2000) using the US Federal Reserve Bank model suggest 
that automatic fiscal stabilisers partially damped aggregate demand shocks but do not 
offset aggregate supply shocks. A general real business cycle model simulation by 
Christiano and Harrison (1999) shows the gains from automatic stabilisers in the tax 
                                                 
2 “Inside lag” refers to the time taken to implement a change in policy; while “outside lag” refers to the time it 
takes to affect the economy once implemented. 
3 New Zealand macro-econometric models generally assume a proportion of liquidity-constrained 
households between 25% and 30% (Rae, 1994, and Black et al 1997); the Federal Reserve Bank model 
assumes 10% of US households are constrained (Cohen and Follette 2000).    5
system are largely through their effect on reducing output volatility.
4 Romer (1999) claims 
that automatic fiscal stabilisers contribute 0.85 percentage points to the real growth rate in 
the year following troughs.   
 
Blanchard (2000) suggests that the results are not surprising given the assumptions in 
most of the models. The OECD INTERLINK model is New-Keynesian in the short run, 
ensuring a role for automatic stabilisers, while the US Federal Reserve Bank model rules 
out Ricardian equivalence in the consumption function specification. 
 
However, Blanchard (2000) notes if automatic stabilisers work then output volatility should 
be smaller in countries with larger governments.  Scatter plots of government size and 
output variability for OECD countries show the expected inverse relation. In addition, 
consistent with Romer (1999), he observes that government size has increased over the 
past century and output volatility has fallen as well. Karras and Song (1996) find a 
negative relationship between output volatility and size of government, significant at the 
10% level for 24 OECD countries over 1960 to 1990. However, larger automatic stabilisers 
are not necessarily preferable, as the size may indicate a high tax burden or an overly 
generous benefit system, both with potentially large deadweight costs.  
 
3.   THE SIZE OF AUTOMATIC FISCAL STABILISERS IN NEW ZEALAND AND THE 
OECD 
This section examines the size of automatic stabilisers in New Zealand relative to the 
average OECD experience. Governments generally allow automatic stabilisers to operate 
to some extent, given the economic benefits. However, the size of automatic stabilisers is 
important for government budget planning and to be able to judge progress towards fiscal 
targets throughout the cycle. 
 
New Zealand results  
OECD calculations over the 1992-2000 period show that automatic stabilisers (that is the 
cyclical component of the fiscal balance) tend to be more negative in New Zealand during 
a recession, but with a limited upside in a boom relative to the rest of the OECD (see 
Figure 1). For example, in the early 1990s recession automatic stabilisers were 3.2% of 
GDP in New Zealand, compared with 1.6% in the United Kingdom, while the mid-1990s 




                                                 
4 In addition, for a selection of articles on automatic fiscal stabilisers in a real business cycle framework, see 
Hairault, Henin and Portier (1997).   
5 The UK estimate that a 1% increase in output relative to trend will increase the budget by 0.4% of GDP in 
year one and 0.3% in the following year. See HM Treasury (1999b).   6
Figure  1. A cross country comparison of the cyclical component of the Government 
operating balance: OECD model 
Source: OECD Economics Department (1999a) 
 
The relatively large size of New Zealand’s automatic stabilisers reflects both higher 
responsiveness of government spending and revenue to deviations from trend growth and 
larger deviations from trend growth.   
 
Figure 2. A cross country comparison of output gaps 
Source: OECD (1999b) 
 
The high correlation between OECD output gap and automatic stabiliser estimates is clear 
from comparing Figures 1 and 2.  While New Zealand was undergoing substantial reforms 
over 1986-2000 (Silverstone, Bollard and Lattimore, 1996), volatile economic growth is not 
unusual in New Zealand. Over 1960 to 1990 New Zealand’s economic growth was volatile 
relative to other OECD countries with a standard deviation of 3.06% compared to the 
average of 2.22% (Karras and Song 1996).  
 
The two main influences on the size of the responsiveness of the budget balance to the 
cycle are the relative size of the government sector and the tax and expenditure 
elasticities.  If the government represents 40% of the economy, then it is intuitive that 
automatic stabilisers will be larger as a percent of GDP, than if the government is only 
10% of the economy. Van den Noord (2000) finds that size of  the government sector 
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Figure 3. Importance of size of government, extract from Van den Noord (2000) 
The elasticity magnitudes for New Zealand are higher than the OECD average, and New 
Zealand’s main trading partners as Table 1 shows. However, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Sweden all have total semi-elasticities of around 0.7 or more. 
 
Table 1. Tax and expenditure elasticities – a cross country comparison 







































Sources:  Van den Noord (2000), Table A.1. p19. 
**  Semi-elasticity: impact of a 1% increase in GDP on the fiscal balance as a per cent of GDP. 
 
4.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Three factors that affect the operation of automatic stabilisers in New Zealand are their 
relatively large size, the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, and the proposed New Zealand 
Super Fund. These factors mean that continual monitoring of the fiscal position and 
outlook is important, even after the Government’s debt target is met. 
 
In New Zealand the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 sets “principles of responsible fiscal 
management”. The use of automatic stabilisers, provided the fiscal position is sound, is 
facilitated by principle (b) of the Act which states that operating expenses must equal 
operating revenue over a ‘reasonable’ period. ‘Reasonable period’ can be interpreted as 
the economic cycle.  The principle helps ensure that the ‘upside’ gain is saved for the 
downside. 
 
Since the introduction of the Act, fiscal outcomes and the use of automatic stabilisers have 
been broadly consistent with the principles. Fowlie (1999) discusses how the discipline 
imposed by the Act was reflected in Government decisions. Automatic stabilisers were 
allowed to operate to a greater extent in the 1998-99 recession than during the 1991 
recession in light of the improved fiscal position.  
 
However the relatively large size of automatic stabilisers in New Zealand implies caution in 
allowing automatic stabilisers to operate. The economic outlook needs to be monitored to   8
ensure the fiscal position is not jeopardised by a structural shock that is thought to be 
cyclical.  
 
Structural surpluses are important under the proposed scheme to partially pre-fund the 
future cost of superannuation.  The scheme requires cash surpluses of up to $2 billion a 
year (2% of GDP) to be put aside in a privately managed Super Fund.  In the build-up to 
the ‘full’ contribution rate, structural surpluses will need to increase (see 2000 Fiscal 
Strategy Report and 2000 Budget Policy Statement).  
 
5.   METHODOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OECD  AND NEW ZEALAND 
ESTIMATES 
The estimated size of automatic stabilisers vary with the method used.  The New Zealand 
Treasury uses a version of the two-step approach, which combines elasticities with output 
gaps. The section below compares and contrasts the approaches, and explains the 
reasons behind the Treasury’s current methodology. 
 
The two step approach to estimate automatic stabilisers is widely used internationally (see 
for example Banca D’Italia, 1999). Alternative approaches, such as using the Structural 
Vector Auto-Regression (SVAR) approach (see Dalsgaard and de Serres 1999), do not 
require a cycle estimate, however the discretionary fiscal policy effects on the budget 
balance are often difficult to separate out. 
 
Measuring the budget balance 
The Treasury’s Cyclically Adjusted Balance (CAB) model uses the operating balance from 
the Statement of Financial Performance for the New Zealand government as its budget 
balance estimate. The Statement is prepared on an accrual accounting basis. Large one-
off items (eg gains on sale of assets) and the effect of liability revaluations are subtracted 
from the operating balance to improve the structural balance’s measure of discretionary 
fiscal policy.   
 
In contrast, the OECD calculations use a cash measure of government revenue and 
spending that excludes financing and investment transactions.  As a result, the trend in the 
cyclical and structural components of the operating balance will be similar, but the level will 
be different. 
 
Figure 4. Government budget balance measures 
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Measuring the cyclical component of output 
There are several methods that can be used to calculate the cyclical component of output 
(Gibbs, 1995).  Fitting a linear trend through actual GDP is the simplest approach, but this 
fails to adequately capture permanent changes in growth. The UK Treasury (1999b) uses 
a co-incident indicator, which is a variant of this approach. Potential growth is a linear 
interpolation between on-trend points, which are estimated using a range of cyclical 
indicators.  For uncompleted cycles, the UK Treasury interpolate a deliberately cautious 
trend growth rate, currently 2 ¼%. 
 
Other methods include smoothing GDP data to fit a trend, with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter, being the most common method.  The HP filter smoothes variations from trend to 
minimise the sum of squared deviations of output from its trend, subject to a smoothing 
factor that penalises squared variations in the growth of the trend series.
6 Problems with 
this approach include the restrictive assumptions on the nature of economic shocks that 
occur, and that it is affected by the estimation end point (see Guay and St-Armant, 1996). 
 
The production function approach uses the relation between capital and labour inputs to 
estimate potential output.  Problems include specification of the production function, 
difficulties in measuring the rate of technological change, and how it interacts with labour 
and capital. The production function method for New Zealand has suffered until recently 
from a lack of an official capital series. 
 
At present the New Zealand Treasury typically uses a structural time series model 
(STAMP) to calculate potential output.  STAMP is used to model real production GDP as a 
function of labour inputs, capacity utilisation, and a stochastic trend.
7  From this 
regression, potential output can be calculated by substituting long run data for capacity 
utilisation and labour c ontributions. The approach avoids some of the problems of 
specifying a production function, while still capturing structural changes that affect 
productive capacity. 
 
The Reserve Bank uses a multivariate filter (MV) approach for estimating the output gap, 
although they also monitor Structural Vector Auto-Regression (SVAR) and Unobserved 
Components (UC) estimates of the output gap.
8 The multivariate filter is similar to the HP 
filter, but minimises weighted variations in inflation, unemployment and capacity utilisation 
from their long run trend values as well as output. 
 
                                                 
6 The smoothing factor is typically set at 1600, but is at the discretion of the user. The smaller the smoothing 
factor chosen the more closely potential output will follow actual output. 
7 Structural Time Series Modeller and Predictor.  STAMP allows the decomposition of a series into its trend, 
seasonal, cyclical and error components.  For the statistical theory, see Harvey (1989) and Harvey and 
Shephard (1993).  Diebold et al (1996) and Judge (1996) provide independent reviews of STAMP.   
8 See Claus, Conway and Scott (2000). SVAR models use labour market (full time employment) and capacity 
utilisation information. UC decomposes actual output into an unobserved trend (potential output), a trend-
reverting component (output gap) and random noise.    10
Figure 5. Alternative output gap measures (% of potential GDP) 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s May 2000 Monetary Policy Statement, The Treasury and OECD 
(1999b) 
Comparison of the different methods in Figure 4 shows that the methods all produce 
similar trends, but point in time estimates vary considerably.  For example, in 1992 there 
was a 6.5% point difference between the high and low output gap estimates. However the 
similar trends do provide comfort that the general story holds fairly consistently over time. 
 
 
Measuring tax and expenditure elasticities 
Within the broad two-step framework, OECD nations currently use three different methods 
to calculate the elasticity of taxation and expenditure items to the economic cycle (OECD, 
1999a Annex 3).   
 
• Regressions: Regress observed tax proceeds and public expenditure on 
discretionary changes in tax or benefit rates, a trend and a cyclical term (eg output 
gap).  
 
• Macro-econometric model: based on the standard-shock simulations calibrated to 
show the impact of a 1% cyclical increase in output on budget variables (see Cohen 
and Follette, 2000).  
 
• Hybrid approach: calculate the elasticities of tax base with respect to cyclical 
economic activity through regression analysis and the elasticity of tax receipts with 
respect to the relevant base extracted from the tax code. The two elasticities are then 
combined. 
 
Both the Treasury and the OECD use the third approach (see the Appendix for details on 
the Treasury approach and Van den Noord 2000). 
 
A comparison between the New Zealand Treasury and the OECD estimates shows that 
the differences between the two sets of estimates are small.  The OECD Secretariat 
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Table 2: New Zealand tax elasticities – a comparison  
  Treasury Estimates  OECD Estimates 
Company Tax 
Income Tax 








Sources:  Appendix of current paper, van den Noord (2000), Table A.1. and OECD (1999a), Table A.1. 
 
Summary 
Despite the level difference in the estimates of the size of automatic stabilisers, the trend is 
similar between Treasury and the OECD estimates. The majority of the difference between 
the OECD a nd Treasury calculation of the size of automatic fiscal stabilisers is the 
alternative estimates of the output gap (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6.  Automatic fiscal stabilisers – Treasury
9 and OECD estimates  
Source: OECD (1999a) Table 1, Annex 1, p3 and New Zealand Treasury.  
 
6.   SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The sensitivity of automatic fiscal stabiliser estimates to assumptions determines their 
usefulness in a policy environment. The sensitivity testing shows that alternative 
assumptions change the level of the estimated automatic stabilisers – making it hard to 
categorically state that the government is running a ‘structural surplus’ at a given point in 
time. But a consistent trend makes it possible to state whether the structural position in 
improving or deteriorating. 
 
The sensitivities tested are: 
 
-  Government budget balance estimates 
-  output gap estimates 
-  elasticities  
-  lags in tax collection 
 
                                                 
9 Finance costs are excluded from the Treasury calculation in Figure 7 to be consistent with the OECD 
estimates. They are not generally excluded in Treasury e stimates. Neither does Treasury cyclically adjust 
debt and finance costs. While adjusting for the cyclical effects on finance costs would provide greater 
conceptual purity, there are offsetting influences. For example during a recession, a cyclical deficit increases 
debt and subsequent financing costs, but interest rates and inflation are likely to be lower than normal.  See 
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Government budget balance estimates 
The New Zealand Treasury uses an adjusted operating balance as the base as discussed 
above.  In contrast, the OECD uses the (cash) Government financial balance from SNA 
(System of National Accounts) data to ensure consistent country comparisons. The 
different level estimates of the government budget does affect the level of the estimated 
structural balance but as discussed above it is the changes in the structural balance rather 
than the level which is more informative.  
 
The different estimates do affect the size of automatic stabilisers, but as shown in Figure 
7, over 1992 to 2000 most of the difference between OECD and Treasury estimates of 
automatic stabilisers come from alternative output gap and elasticity assumptions.   
 
Figure 7. Automatic stabilisers – NZ Treasury and OECD 
Source: The Treasury and OECD (1999a) 
 
Output gap estimates 
As pointed out in Section 5, at any one point in time, output gap estimates may vary by a 
reasonably wide margin. For example, output gap estimates for the 2000 June quarter 
(when first released) included: 
 
Linear  3.3% 
HP filter  1.3% 
STAMP  0.1% 
MV filter  -0.2% 
 
Source: The Treasury and The Reserve Bank of New Zealand website 
 
In addition, the output gap estimates for a point in time change significantly. The June 
1998 quarter was estimated at –2.5% under by the STAMP method and by the Reserve 
Bank at the time of release, however latest estimates by both methods have revised this to 
–1.6%. 
 
Figure 8 shows the implications of the alternative output gap estimates for the estimation 
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Figure 8. Estimates of automatic stabilisers under alternative output gap measures 
The linear estimate attributes more of the fluctuation in output to the cycle and as a result 
the estimated automatic stabilisers are larger.  In contrast, the STAMP estimate of trend 
follows actual output more closely, reducing the cycle estimate and therefore the size of 
automatic stabilisers. 
 
Figure 9. Actual GDP and Potential GDP estimates  
 
i Stamp  ii Multivariate filter 
   
iii Linear  iv H-P filter 
   
 
Elasticities 
The elasticities used by the New Zealand Treasury and the OECD have varied over the 
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Table 3: Alternate revenue elasticity estimates  
 


















et al  
1990 
Individual income tax  1.12  1.12  1.25  1.2  1.2 
Company tax  1.1  1  2.5  0.9  2.5 
Withholding tax and other direct   1  1  1     
GST  1.1  1  1  1.2  1 
Excise duties  1  1  1     
Other indirect tax  1  1  1     
Interest, profits and dividend 
income 
1  1  1     
Other revenue  1  1  1     
 
Both the Treasury and OECD estimates of automatic stabilisers assume constant 
elasticities across the estimation period, but over the 1990s New Zealand’s individual 
income tax rates flattened and import tariffs (included in excise duties) were either reduced 
or removed.  The elasticities presented in Table 3 may have been correct for the period 
they were estimated in.  
 
We tested the sensitivity of automatic stabilisers to the three largest tax components 
(individual tax, company tax, GST).  The elasticity for individual tax and GST was adjusted 
50% either way from the current elasticity that the New Zealand Treasury uses.  For 
company tax, the elasticities tested were 0.5, 1.5 and 2.5 (see Table 4). 
 
The Treasury Cyclically Adjusted Balance (CAB) model cyclically adjusts unemployment 
expenditure by first estimating cyclical unemployment using an Okun coefficient of 0.5.  
Estimates of the Okun coefficient vary. Harris and Silverstone (1999) argue that the long 
run Okun c oefficient for New Zealand is 0.41, while the Reserve Bank imposes 0.33 
(Claus et al 2000), similar to the 0.35 coefficient estimated by Gibbs (1995), and the range 
Okun (1962) originally estimated of 0.35-0.4. 
 
Table 4: Elasticity ranges tested in sensitivity analysis 
 
  Individual 
income tax  Company tax  GST 
Okun 
coefficient 
LOW  0.56  0.5  0.5  0.25 
Current setting  1.12  1  1  0.5 
HIGH  1.68  2.5  1.5  0.75 
   15
Figure 10. Sensitivity of the cyclical component of the operating balance to alternative 
elasticities. 
i Individual income tax  ii Company tax 
   
iii GST  iv Unemployment 
   
 
The sensitivity analysis in Figure 9 shows that the calculation of automatic fiscal stabilisers 
is relatively robust with respect to the elasticities for the largest components.  If all the 
elasticities are set to either the maximum or minimum value the largest difference is 0.5% 
of GDP in 1993, while the average difference is only 0.1%. 
 




Maximum difference in 
AFS 
Individual income tax  0.2 
Company tax  0.1 
GST  0.1 
Okun coefficient  0.1 
   
All changed  0.5 
 
It should be kept in mind that the following assumptions are made in the CAB model in 
estimating the size of automatic fiscal stabilisers: 
 
•  Interest revenue is assumed to be insensitive to the economic cycle. 
•  Surpluses or deficits from State Owned Enterprises and Crown Entities  move with 
the cycle, but with an elasticity of one. 
•  Other expenditure (eg health, education) aside from unemployment is not adjusted 
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Lag weights 
Tax rules may allow tax payment or recognition to be deferred for one or more periods.  
The three main tax types were tested, with the slowest lag for each being set at 0.5, the 
fastest at 1.  The lag weight represents the fraction of tax receipts in any given year that 
results from income in that same year.   
 
Table 6: Lag ranges tested in sensitivity analysis 
  Individual 
income tax  Company tax  GST 
LOW  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Current setting  0.9  0.8  0.9 
HIGH  0.5  0.5  0.5 
 
The calculation of automatic fiscal stabilisers is not very sensitive to the lag weights used, 
apart from individual income tax.   
 
Table 7: Difference in automatic stabiliser estimates from changing lag assumptions 
  Maximum difference in AFS 
(% of GDP) 
Individual income tax  0.2 
Company tax  0.0 
GST  0.1 
All changed  0.3 
 
Implications of sensitivity testing 
The widely different point-in-time output gap estimates produce quite different point-in-time 
estimates of automatic stabilisers. As a result relying on automatic stabiliser estimates for 
budgeting and decision making is difficult as a given budget deficit may be entirely cyclical 
(remedial action is not required) or entirely structural (remedial action required), depending 
on the output gap method used.  For example in 1994 the multivariate filter estimated that 
the budget balance was benefiting from the economic cycle by 0.3% of GDP, while the 
linear trend showed a cost of the cycle of 3.7% of GDP.   
 
Therefore only the trend in the structural balance and automatic stabiliser estimates should 
be used for policy purposes. For example, the structural balance has fallen/risen over time 
demonstrating a looser/tighter fiscal policy is being run. International comparisons of 
automatic stabilisers are still meaningful provided that a consistent methodology is being 
applied across each country. 
 
7.   CONCLUSION 
This paper examined a number of issues concerning automatic fiscal stabilisers.  A 
theoretical overview of the effectiveness of automatic fiscal stabilisers was given, the 
benefits and costs involved in their operation, and the resulting implications for policy 
described.  
 
The caution for New Zealand is that our cycle and the budget response to the cycle both 
tend to be larger than the OECD average. While there are benefits of allowing automatic 
stabilisers to operate, it is of great importance that economic shocks are monitored 
carefully, so that if an adverse cyclical shock turns out to be structural, the budget balance 
is not left to absorb this shock.  While the 1994 Fiscal Responsibility Act requires the   17
government to constantly monitor the fiscal outlook, and debt is at its lowest in over two 
decades, there exists a potential for this position to easily reverse.  
 
Another factor which makes prudent action more difficult is that the calculation of 
automatic stabilisers vary significantly depending on the estimation method. The size of 
automatic stabilisers is most sensitive to the estimated output gap  – making any 
interpretation at a given point in time difficult.  However given the generally similar trends 
in automatic stabilisers and the structural balance it is possible to say whether the fiscal 
position is improving or deteriorating. 
   18
APPENDIX: THE NEW ZEALAND TREASURY’S CAB MODEL 
The Treasury cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) model can be used to estimate the 
(annual) size of automatic stabilisers in three steps: 
-  calculate size of output gap 
-  calculate sensitivity of tax and unemployment spending to the output gap 
-  combine output gap and elasticities to estimate automatic stabilisers 
 
This model was first developed in Bagrie (1996). 
 
1. Calculation of the output gap 
The most important step in calculating the CAB is the output gap, measured as: 
 
  Actual GDP – Potential GDP 
    Potential GDP 
 
Treasury uses a variety of methodologies to assess potential output. The CAB model uses 
the STAMP programme (Structural Time Series Analyser, Modeller and Predictor). The 
programme is based on the following function: 
 
Observation = trend + seasonal + cycle + irregular 
 




e b a a a + + + + + = seasonals T CUBO Hrs actGDP ) ln( ) ln( 3 2 1  
 
where: 
actGDP  =    ln(actual real production GDP) 
Hrs   =    Hours worked a week (HLFS, actual) 
CUBO  =    New Zealand Institute of Economic Research      
          measure of capacity utilisation 
T  =    Stochastic time trend 
 
The estimation period starts in 1980 Q1. The coefficients are re-estimated as additional 
quarterly data becomes available.  The coefficient for hours worked (a2) is typically around 
0.25 and the CUBO coefficient (a3) is around 0.42. 
 




e b a a a + + + + + = seasonals T CUBO Emp hrs LF Emp WAP LF WAP actGDP ) ln( ) / ( * ) / ( * ) / ( * ln( 3 2 1  
 
Potential output is calculated by substituting long run averages, for capacity utilisation and 




e b a a a + + + + - + = seasonals T CUBO LR ee e hrs LR LRunemp LFPR LR WAP potGDP ) _ ln( ) ' _ _ * ) 1 ( * _ * ln( 3 2 1  
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WAP  =    working age population 
LF  =    labour force 
LRunemp  =    smoothed actual unemployment, using the HP filter 
Emp  =    employment 
LR_CUBO  =    smoothed CUBO, using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
LR_LFPR  =  average labour force participation rate over the estimation 
period.  
LR_hrs_per e’ee =    average of total hours worked / total employment over 
estimation period. 
 
The long run unemployment and CUBO estimates were derived using a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter.  Long run unemployment has previously been interpreted as the NAIRU (non 
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) and subjectively smoothed through the 
unusually high levels in the early 1990s. Using the HP estimates for long run 
unemployment reduces the size of automatic stabilisers calculated over 1991-1997, but by 
no more than 0.2% of GDP in any one year.  
 
Figure A.1 Revised unemployment assumptions 
 
   
 
Source: The Treasury, OECD (2000) 
 
2. Elasticities 
The effect of the economic cycle on the operating balance is calculated by multiplying the 
output gap by revenue and expense elasticities.   
 
Revenue 
The responsiveness of revenue to output depends on two effects: 
 
-  the responsiveness of the tax type to a change in its base 
-  the responsiveness of the tax base to a change in output. 
 
The chain rule gives the following link between variations in tax and output. 
 
eT,Y = eT,B * eB,Y  
 
where T is the tax type, B is its base and Y is nominal GDP.  The elasticities are estimated 
directly for the three largest tax types, and set at one for other tax types. 
 
As output increases, tax increases, but the increase in each tax base may not be 
proportional. This base shift reflects the possibility that factor income shares may fluctuate, 
reflecting a change in the existing economic structure.   
Unemployment Rate
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The following bases were used for the different tax types: 
 
Personal income 
COE   compensation of employees  
PY    compensation of employees plus entrepreneurial income 
 
Corporate income 
OS     operating surplus national accounts definition 
COS    operating surplus less non-corporate income (eg farm) 
 
GST base 
CONRI   private consumption plus total residential investment in current dollar 
terms 
 
The output elasticity with respect to the base (eB,Y) is calculated two ways:  
 
-  The annual percentage change in the appropriate tax base as a ratio of the 
percentage change in income GDP is calculated for each year of 1984-2000. These 
estimates are variable, but are averaged over the period.  
-  The log of tax base is regressed on log GDP.
10 
 
Table A.1 Output elasticity with respect to tax base 
 
  Average  Average  Average  Regression 
  84-00 ex 91/92  93-00  95-00  83-00, ex 91/92 
COE  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.8 
PY  0.9  0.9  1.1  0.9 
         
OS  1.2  1.2  1.0  1.1 
COS  1.1  1.1  0.6  1.1 
         
CONRI  1.1  1.2  1.4  1.1 
 
The regression estimates are used for the output elasticity (eB,Y) while the tax elasticity 
with respect to the base (eT,B) is set to 1 for flat taxes (corporate and GST). TAXMOD
11 
estimates the base elasticity at 1.29 for individual taxes, allowing for the recent top tax rate 
increase to 39%.
12  Table A.2 shows the resulting total elasticities. 
 
Table A.2 Output elasticity of tax revenue 
 
   Tsy2000
13  OECD1999a 
Individual tax  1.12  = 1.29*0.87  1.2 
Corporate tax  1.10  = 1.0*1.1  0.9 
GST  1.10  = 1.0*1.1  1.2 
 
                                                 
10 The recession years of 1991 and 1992 are dummied out as the annual estimates are very noisy around 
this period. This has only a small effect on the estimated elasticities. 
11 A model of the NZ population designed to forecast data and model policy proposals related to income, tax 
and transfers. 
12 The OECD estimates compared against the revised Treasury estimates in Table A.2 do not include the 
effect of the tax rise. 
13 The estimated output elasticity with respect to tax base used in Table A.2 is the rounded version of the 
regression estimates in Table A.1, where 0.87 is the average over 1995-200 for COE.   21
Traditionally these elasticities have been combined with lags, to allow for the possibility 
that income may not always be recognised in the same period that GDP increases.  It also 
reflects that tax years and the government fiscal year end do not always align.
14 
 
Dividend and other income are also adjusted for the economic cycle, reflecting that 
company profits underlying the dividend income also moves with the economic cycle. The 
elasticity is set at 1. Interest income is assumed to be insensitive to the economic cycle. 
 
Thus cyclically adjusted revenue is calculated as: 
 
)] * 1 ( * ) 1 ( ) * 1 ( * [ * _ ' 1 , , - - + - + - + = t Y T t Y T it it gap e gap e revenue revenue d cycadj q q    
where q represents the lag.  
 
Table A.3 Summary of revenue assumptions  
 
  Elasticity  Lag weight (q)   % of total revenue 
(1999/2000) 
Individual Income Tax  1.12  0.9  43% 
Company Tax  1.1  0.8  11% 
Other Direct Tax  1.0  0.9  5% 
GST  1.1  0.9  24% 
Excise Duties  1.0  0.9  6% 
Other Indirect Tax  1.0  0.9  4% 
Interest  0  1.0  2% 
Dividends  1.0  1.0  1% 
Other income  1.0  1.0  4% 
 
Expenses - Unemployment 
Cyclically adjusted unemployment is derived using the output gap and the Okun coefficient 
(-1/b), which is assumed to be 0.5.   
 
  t t t gap U U ) ( )
1
( • - =
*
b
  (4) 
 
where:   U   =  actual unemployment rate 
U*  =  benchmark unemployment rate 
 
Cyclically adjusted unemployment expenditure is assumed to move proportionally to the 
ratio of unemployment to benchmark unemployment.  
 






= * * * . ( )
*
52  (5) 
where:  une    =  unemployment expenditure 
av.benefit     =  average weekly benefit 
beneficiaries =  number of unemployment beneficiaries 
 
                                                 
14 In light of the sensitivity of the automatic stabilisers to the lags used, as calculated in this paper, the lag 
weights will be dropped in future calculations.   22
3. Automatic stabilisers calculation 
The following table presents the size of automatic stabilisers, assuming that the NZ 
economy was 1% above trend in 1999/2000 (lag effects are ignored for simplicity). 
 




  Outpt 
gap 






Calculation  Result 
Individual tax  1%  1.12  15,776  15,599  =15,776*1%*1.12  177 
Company tax  1%  1.1  4,158  4,112  =4,158*1%*1.1  46 
GST  1%  1.1  8,871  8,773  =8,871*1%*1.1  98 
Other tax  1%  1  5,230  5,178  =5,230*1%*1  52 
             
Unemplymt
15  1%  -0.5 
(Okun) 
UR = 6.4% 
UB=1,538 




TOTAL      32,497  32,004    493 
 
 
                                                 
15 This represents the unemployment component of the Community Wage.  The Community wage also 
includes sickness and training components.  
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